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IMPLYING A PROMISE TO ESTABLISH MUTUALITY
M

contracts are made by business men without the aid
of legal advice. It occasionally happens that although
they have gone through the form and motions of making a
bilateral contract, one party has in fact neglected or omitted to make an express promise on his side in a matter apparently material towards carrying out the supposed intention of one or both of the parties. In such a case courts
have sometimes implied a promise and sometimes have declined to do so. Where such promise has been implied the
courts have said there is mutuality of obligation and the
contract is enforceable; where no such promise was implied
there was said to be no mutuality and no enforceable contract. The problem upon which this article attempts to shed
light is: Under what circumstances have the courts implied
the counter-promise and under what circumstances have they
not?
A review of the cases may make possible a deduction of
certain rules or principles governing the implication of such
promises.
It is a time-worn maxim in the law of contracts that
unless both parties are bound, neither will be bound.1 This
has commonly been referred to as the doctrine of mutuality
of obligation. 2 It is another way of saying there must be
valid consideration. 3
OST

'This maxim appears to have been first judicially recognized in 1698 in
Harrison v. Cage, 5 Mod. 411, 412, where it was held in the King's Bench
that in a bilateral agreement "either all is a tudiom pactuio, or else the on.
promise is as good as the other." The rule that both parties must be bound
or neither is bound has often been stated by text-writers. See ADDISON, LAW
AT CONTRACT (11th ed. "1911) 14; ASHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1911)
§ 31; CLARK, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1914) 145; LEAKE, CONTRACTS (7th ed. 1921)
7; 1 PAGE, LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1922) 959; WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
(Revised ed. 1936) § 103 E.
2Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 121,
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 343.
3 "It is often stated, as if it were a requisite in the formation of contracts,
that there must be mutuality. This form of statement is likely to cause confusion and, however limited, is at best an unnecessary way of stating that there
must be valid consideration." WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Revised ed. 1936)

§ 141.
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From the very nature of a unilateral contract---viz., an
obligation outstanding on only one side at the time the contract is formed-the doctrine of mutuality does not apply
to it. 4 It is applicable only to bilateral agreements; that is,
to agreements containing a promise on each side.5
Even as recent as the beginning of the present century,
courts were still looking for a clear promise on each side in
bilateral contracts.6 A bargain which lacked such a promise by one of the parties was held to be wanting in mutuality, and therefore, to be unilateral and unenforceable. But,
since, where the transaction is unilateral, one party may be
at the mercy of the other, and, where the transaction is bilateral, both parties are protected as soon as the promises
are interchanged, the tendency has developed, wherever possible, as a matter of interpretation of intention, to imply a
promise where one is lacking, in order that there may be
7

mutuality.

EmPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.

The problem has often arisen in purported contracts of
employment where there are covenants by the servant to
'WILLISTON

ON CONTRACTS

(Revised ed. 1936) § 141.

There are, however, several types of executory bilateral contracts which
may be binding on one party and not on the other. See Ballantine, Mutuality
and Consideration (1914) 28 HARV. L. Rv. 121, SELECTED READINGS ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 343; Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation itBilateral
Contractsat Law (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 705, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS (1931) 353.
'WILLISTON

ON CONTRACTS

(Revised ed. 1936) § 31A.

"A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct
with an obligation' imperfectly expressed." Cardozo, J., in Wood v. Lady
Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118,N. E. 214 (1917).
"In a certain contract an express promise by one party may be lacking,
yet when the agreement is viewed as a whole, it may be seen to be meaningless unless such a promise is implied. The grant to him of certain rights requires the assumption by him of certain duties. The courts will interpret such
contracts as business men would ordinarily understand them, and they would
understand the contract as intended to have business efficacy." Andrews, J.,
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in Recent Years, How they have affected
Substantive Law (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 433, 447.
"The law will, sometimes, in the absence of express stipulation on the
subject, infer a contract or promise from one party to the other, from the
nature of the transaction, or the supposed intention of the parties, where the
circumstances would seem to authorize the assumption that such an obligation
was within the contemplation of the parties when making their contract."
Roger, C.J., in Dermott v. The State, 99 N. Y. 101 (1885).
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serve and do other things but no express promise by the
master to employ the servant. For example, a workman
entered into an agreement with a coal company to serve as
a collier, in consideration of wages to be paid to him fortnightly, and the company, in consideration of such service,
agreed that he should not be discharged without twentyeight days notice in writing, unless in the case of misconduct. It was held that this contract necessarily implied an
obligation on the part of the master to find work for the
servant, and to pay him wages every fortnight; and consequently was not bad for want of mutuality.8
In an often cited New York case 9 a formal agreement
was entered into between the parties providing for the defendant's employment by the plaintiff for a term of six years
and in which the defendant covenanted to engage in no
other occupation during that period and to use his best endeavors to promote the business and business interests of
the plaintiff. The contract contained no express promise
by the plaintiff to employ the defendant for the term but did
expressly reserve to the plaintiff the right to terminate the
contract at any time upon giving thirty days notice to the
defendant. In a suit to enjoin the defendant from entering
the service of a rival company during the six-year term,
Scott, J., said:
"It is claimed that the contract of employment is unenforceable for lack of mutuality. It is true that
plaintiff does not by precise words engage to employ
defendant for the term specified, but the whole contract is instinct with such an obligation on its part,
and there can be no doubt that upon a fair construction it imports a hiring by the plaintiff, as well as
an obligation to serve by the defendant." (Italics
supplied.)
Sometimes the court is called upon to construe a hybrid contract in which the parties couple an agreement for
payment by piece-work with the inconsistent provision that
'Whittle v. Frankland, 2 B. & S. 49 (1862).
'McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App. Div. 62, 133 App. Div. 892, 117 N. Y.
Supp. 775, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (1st Dept. 1909).
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the service shall only be determinable upon a certain number of days written notice, and there is no express promise
by the master to provide the servant with work. What is
the implication as to providing work which the court ought
to read into the contract? There are two English cases on
this point. In neither was it held that the agreement was
void for want of mutuality, because in the first case 10 it
imported an obligation by the master to provide the workman with work so long as the service continued, and in
the second case 11 there was implied an undertaking by
the master to provide the servant with a reasonable amount
of work so long as the employment lasted, the measure of
what was reasonable being the average amount of the servant's earnings previously to the stoppage of the work. In
the latter case, Jelf, J., said:
"Apart from authority it would be strange if such a
right is not implied; for otherwise the bargain is of a
very one-sided character. The workman must be at
the beck and call of the master whenever required
to do so, and yet he cannot, though ready and willing
to work and to earn his pay, earn a single penny unless the master chooses; and this state of things may
go on for a period of nearly two months, as the
twenty-eight days notice to quit the service can only
be given on the first Monday in the month, and if
given on the first Tuesday in 'the month, would not
expire till twenty-eight days from the first Monday
in the next month."
In some instances it has been the servant who has made
no express promise. For example, in a well-known New
York case, 12 the plaintiff testified without objection, that he
had a conversation with the defendant "on account of the
job at 138-140 East 40th Street and we were talking over
matters, and then he asked me, 'Mr. Grossman, how much
you are charging for superintending that job' and I told
"Regina v. Welch, 2 E. & B. 357 (Q. B. 1853).
"Devonald v. Rosser & Sons, 2 K. B. 728 (1906).
Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39 (1912).
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Mr. Schenker that job is worth in a general way, that is
worth over a thousand dollars, but I will tell you what I
will do with you, I will make you five hundred dollars for
superintending the job. * * * Mr. Schenker said, will I keep

my word, five hundred dollars and I said, 'yes my word is
good for gold,' and he says, 'all right, you will have the
A motion to dismiss on the ground that there was
job.'
no mutuality of agreement was denied. This ruling was
affirmed by both the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals. Vann, J., writing for the Court of Appeals said:
"The general rule is that a promise, not under seal,
made by one party with none by the other is void,
for unless both are bound so that either can sue the
other for a breach, neither is bound. If, however,
there is a sufficient consideration mutual promises
are not essential, for the consideration supports the
promise although made by one party only. Even
when the obligation of a unilateral promise is suspended for want of mutuality at its inception, still
upon performance by the promisee a consideration
arises 'which relates back to the making of the promise, and it becomes obligatory.'
"A contract includes not only what the parties said
but also what is necessarily to be implied from what
they said. Thus the words 'cash on delivery' with no
other promise to pay 'imply a promise and create an
obligation' to make payment upon delivery. So the
word 'sold' in a written agreement implies not only a
contract to sell, but also a contract to buy; and a contract to buy with no express promise to sell implies
the latter obligation. 'What is implied in an express
contract is as much a part of it as what is expressed,'
for 'the law is a silent factor in every contract.'
"It was for the jury to infer what was meant by the
parties from what they said. Hence they could find
that the defendant asked the plaintiff how much he
would charge for superintending the job; that the
plaintiff replied he would accept five hundred dollars
for doing that work; that the defendant said all right,
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and that the parties thus agreed, the one to superintend, the other to pay."
The question whether the court would imply a promise
on the part of the servant to serve was answered in the negative by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New
York in a later case, 1 3 in which one Sorrentino and one
Sperandeo brought actions to recover damages for breach of
alleged contracts, both of which were alike and read as
follows:
"According to our verbal agreement, we confirm as
follows: Beginning today, you are appointed a factory foreman and dryman of the above written company, and addicted to the oversight of the employees,
who are employed in this factory. Your hours of
work or employment will be from 7 A. M. to 12 M.
and from 1 P. M. to 6 P. M. All overtime shall be
paid extra. The lowest weekly salary that you will
get shall be $15 for six days of the week. The present
contract expires 1st of June 1917.
(Signed by a stamp) P. Daussa & Co.
D. Garello, Manager."
There was no letter written by either of the plaintiffs to
the defendants, or to the manager binding themselves to serve
the defendants for a period of two years or for any period of
time. From judgments in the plaintiffs' favor in the Municipal Court, defendants appealed. The judgments were reversed and the complaint in each case dismissed. Shearn, J.,
writing for the Appellate Term said:
"It is obvious no bilateral agreement was made, for
there is no pretense that any promise was made by
the plaintiffs. The case of Grossman v. Schenker, 206
N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39, is cited by the respondents,
but is an authority in support of the appellants.
Therein the court said: 'The general rule is that a
promise, not under seal, made by one party, with none
Sorrentino v. Bouchet, 161 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1916).
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by the other is void, for, unless both are bound, so
that either can sue the other for a breach, neither is
bound. If, however, there is a sufficient consideration, mutual promises are not essential, for the consideration supports the promise, although made by
one party only.'
"In other words, there are certain cases where, on
proof of an agreement between the parties, or such a
meeting of the minds as is shown by an offer and its
acceptance, a promise to perform a specified work
may be implied, and the implied promise to do the
work is just as effective as the express one made by
the other party to pay. In the absence of any proof
of such an agreement, performance constitutes a sufficient consideration for the express promise of one,
although there is no promise, express or implied, on
the part of the other. Neither element exists in this
case."
Mr. Justice Shearn also said:
"Neither is there any evidence in the record that the
plaintiffs agreed orally with the defendants, or with
any one representing the defendants, that they would
continue in the employment of the defendants, until
June 1, 1917, or for any period of time."
He then proceeds to give the evidence bearing on an
oral agreement, if any, made between the parties. The manager testified that he agreed to hire Sperandeo, and that the
latter said: "All right, I will come, provided you will give
us a written contract." Sperandeo testified on his direct examination that, when he was asked by the manager to accept the position, he answered: "I told him, 'Yes,' and he
said, 'Do you want to come and work here' and I said, 'I
want to come and work here, but in the first place I want
to be guaranteed as to the work." It would seem under the
liberal views entertained by the Court of Appeals in Grossnman v. Schenker,14 that such evidence would be sufficient
"Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39 (1912).
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to warrant an implied promise on the part of Sperandeo to
serve defendants upon being given a written guarantee of
work such as the defendants gave him. The plaintiff, Sorrentino, on his direct examination, testified that he had
worked in the defendants' place of business before and had
been discharged, and that therefore, when he was asked to
accept the position a second time he insisted on a contract.
With reference to this evidence, Mr. Justice Shearn said:
"Furthermore, in the case of a contract of employment, either unperformed or partially performed, a
promise on the part of the employee to continue in
the service of the employer for any definite period
cannot be implied, where there is merely a promise
by the employer to continue the employment for such
period. It would be unreasonable to imply that the
employee had bound himself to a long term of service
simply because the employer had promised to keep
him that long. The fact that the employer could not
succeed in having any such promise implied precludes
the employee from maintaining an action upon the
unilateral promise of the employer."
This case was distinguished by Hubbs, then presiding
justice of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in a
case decided a few years later,'5 in which he said:
"It is urged by the respondent that the contract is
unilateral and unenforceable, and our attention is
called to the case of Sorrentino v. Bouchet (Sup)
161 N. Y. Supp. 262. In that case Mr. Justice Shearn
stated that there was no evidence in the record that
the servant agreed to remain in the service for any
definite time. In the case at bar, the letter from the
defendant upon which the plaintiff relied in withdrawing his resignation and remaining in the defendants' service contains words which, taken with the
other evidence in the case, would justify a jury in
" Fellows v. Fairbanks Co., 205 App. Div. 271, 199 N. Y. Supp. 772 (4th
Dept. 1923).
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finding that there was an agreement for a definite

term.

To quote again:

'The confidential arrange-

ment between us embodying your employment with
the Fairbanks Company is that * * * for the year 1921
you are to receive a salary at the rate of $1,500 per
year.'
"The salary to be paid was for the year 1921.

It

was to be paid pursuant to the arrangement made
between the parties. The jury might find that the
word 'arrangement' was used in the sense of agree-

ment or contract.

5 Corpus Juris 373; People v.

American Ice Co. (Sup)

120 N. Y. Supp. 443.

If

there was an agreement between the parties that the
plaintiff was to receive a salary of $4,500 for the year
1921, then there was an express promise by the defendant to pay the salary and an implied promise by

the plaintiff to serve during that period."
SALES CONTRACTS.

It frequently happens that a memorandum of sale contains an express promise by only one of the parties. Sometimes the court has implied a promise to buy for the reason
that the parties have apparently intended a contract to sell
and in the very nature of things there cannot be a contract
to sell without a contract to purchase. This view was taken
by Mr. Justice Hunt in a case decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States 16 in which he said:
" Butler v. Thomson et al., 92 U. S. 412, 23 L. ed. 684 (1875).

Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, 5 F. (2d) 723 (1925)

See also,

(a contract

providing that one party "shall purchase" from the other its output of tobacco
stems for ten years; held, by implication to bind the other to sell. Dawson,
D.J.: "Nor is the contract a unilateral one. It is true that the contract provides, 'The new company shall purchase from the Continental Company its
entire output of Burley Tobacco stems for a period of ten years from July
1, 1899,' etc., and there is no express provision that the Continental Company
shall sell such entire output to the new company, but the contention of the
government, that the failure of the contract in express words to impose this
obligation upon the Continental Company makes the contract a unilateral one,
is the utmost refinement of construction. In construing all contracts it is the
duty of the court to arrive at the intention of the parties, if such intention
can be gathered from the language of the contract itself, and the court has
no hesitation in holding that the Continental Company, by the contract in
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"The written memorandum recites that Butler & Co.
sold the iron to the defendants at a price named; but
it is said there is no recital that the defendants had
bought the iron. There is a contract of sale, it is
argued, but not a contract of purchase * * *
"Under these authorities, it seems clear that there can
be no sale unless there is a purchase, as there can be
no purchase unless there be a sale. When, therefore,
the parties mutually certify and declare in writing
that Butler & Co. have sold a certain amount of iron
to Thomson & Co., at a price named, there is included
therein a certificate and declaration that Thomson &
Co. have bought the iron at that price * * * .

"The memorandum in question, expressing that the
iron had been sold, imported necessarily that it had
been bought. The contract was signed by the agent
of both parties, the buyer and the seller, and in our
opinion, was a perfect contract, obligatory upon both
the parties thereto."
Sometimes the court is aided in its construction by some
phrase or clause in the memorandum which adds strength7
to the implication of a promise. For example in a case 1
where the memorandum contained the words: "We agree
to deliver

* * *

cash on delivery" it was held that the memo-

randum was not a nudum pactumn; the court saying:
"Although there is no distinct and express promise
in terms by the plaintiff to pay the price specified,
the terms 'cash on delivery' imply a promise and create an obligation to make such payment when the
rifles are delivered."
In the same spirit of interpretation courts have seized
on the phrase, "in consideration of W. P. Fuller & Co. buying" as a ground for implying an agreement by the latter
question, intended to and did obligate itself to furnish its entire output of
Burley Stems, during the period covered by the contract, to the new company,
as fully
as if it had so undertaken in express language.").
' 1Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 493 (1870).
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to buy as a consideration for the express promise of the other
party to sell. 18
Likewise where there is an express promise to sell but
no express promise to buy, the word "confirmed" written
by the buyer at the bottom of the written instrument opposite his signature, has been held to imply a promise on his
part to buy; 19 the court saying:
"The contract is not an option given by Carl Coon,
nor is it a unilateral agreement, such as the offer of
a reward. By it Carl Coon said he sells wheat, future delivery, at a certain price to Dement Bros. Company. It is impossible to sell unless at the same time
there is a purchaser. The one obligation must have
its corresponding and co-relative obligation. Therefore, when Carl Coon signed the contract he obligated
himself to sell wheat, future delivery, at the price
stated to Dement Bros. Co., and, when the latter wrote
on it the word 'confirmed' and then signed it, respondent entered into the correlative obligation of purchasing wheat, future delivery, at the price stated,
from Carl Coon. The same may be said with reference to the obligation of respondent to receive the
wheat." (Italics supplied.)
Although the word "confirmed" was thus held to imply
a promise, courts have declined to give that effect to the
word "accepted" written by one who made no express promise. In a case decided in the same state 20 as the case just
quoted from, the word "accepted" written by the offeree of
an offer which recited that "in consideration" of the offeree
"soliciting and delivering ice," in a certain area, the offeror
"agrees to sell pure merchantable ice" for $1.50 a ton for
the offeree's "requirements during 1916," was held not to
constitute an express or implied promise on the offeree's
" Fuller & Co. v. Schrenk, 58 App. Div. 222, 68 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1st
Dept. 1901), aff'd, 171 N. Y. 671, 64 N. E. 1126 (1901).
Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash. 603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919).
SMowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 190 Pac.
330 (1920). See also Carpenter v. Foundation Co., 124 Misc. 765, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 327 (1924), where "accepted" written on an option by the optionee
was construed to mean merely that the option terms were correct.
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part. Practically the same attitude was taken by the Appellate Division in New York in a case where the defendant
had invented a certain machine but was encountering difficulty in procuring a patent for it, and did not have the financial means to market the invention. The plaintiff wrote
him offering to obtain a patent for and to assist him financially in marketing the invention for 40% of the profits
realized. Underneath this written offer, the defendant
wrote: "I accept the above" and signed his name. The
plaintiff procured the patent but before he had had a chance
to market the invention, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff's services were no longer required. The court refused to take the position that a bilateral contract had been formed by the defendant's writing
"I accept the above," because that did not give the plaintiff
any exclusive
right nor did it oblige the defendant in any
21
way.

Where a written instrument confained an express promise by one party to sell steers by the carload, but no express
promise by the other party to buy, the words "Said J. Raines
to have the privilege of selecting the two loads that he takes
on or before February 16th" was held to imply a promise
on the part of the latter to buy.22 West, J., said:
"Usually one who signs a written instrument which
calls itself a contract may well be assumed to have
intended to accept it. IHere the paper laboriously
consumes one-fifth of its space in saying, 'Contracts
by and between G. G. lRailsback, party of the first
part, and Raines, party of the second part.' Raines
could not be a party of the second part to a contract
which had only a party of the first part. When two
parties agree that one is to sell cattle to the other,
the latter to have the selection of those he takes on
or before a certain date, this agreement is a contract,
binding on both, and this is what perspicuously appears from the paper which these parties both signed.
The fact that it was frequently referred to by the deSonino v. Magrini, 225 App. Div. 536, 234 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st Dept.
1929).
'Raisback v. Raines, 110 Kan. 220, 200 Pac. 687 (1922).
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fendant as a contract, even on the witness stand, is
not a necessary, but a significant, expression of what
was in his mind when he signed his name to the
paper."
As an illustration of "down east Yankee shrewdness"
the contract in a Maine case 2 3 is hard to beat. One Binford and Jones & Co. agreed in writing that Binford should
plant and cultivate four acres with sweet corn and, when
it was ripe, would from time to time, upon reasonable notice
from Jones & Co., gather and deliver the corn at a certain
corn-canning factory and Jones & Co. agreed to pay Binford "for all his corn so received" at a price named. In an
action for breach of contract it was contended that although
there was an express promise by Jones & Co. to pay for all
corn received by them, the written instrument did not bind
them to receive any, and hence the express promise to pay
amounts to nothing and the agreement lacked mutuality.
On this point Danforth, J., said:
"But it is claimed that here there is virtually no promise on the part of the plaintiff; that the contract is
so cunningly worded that while there is in it a distinct unqualified promise to pay for the corn 'so received' there is under it no obligation to receive any.
This depends upon the meaning of the words 'so received' and that is to be ascertained by consulting the
previous clause, which imposed the obligation resting
upon the defendant.
"In that clause the defendant agrees to plant and
cultivate four acres of sweet corn and when the corn
is in proper condition for packing, he will, upon
proper notice, deliver to the plaintiffs, as wanted, the
corn so raised 'at their factory in Hiram.' In the
next clause the plaintiffs agree to pay a price specified for all the corn 'so received.' The necessary inference is that the delivery provided for is the reception referred to. The one is the same as the other,
and when the delivery is completed, so: is the recepSJones & Co. v. Binford, 74 Me. 439 (1883).
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tion. As the delivery is incumbent upon the defendant, he has only to perform his duty in that respect,
and the obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to pay
follows necessarily. The clause is the same in effect
and imposes the same obligation upon the plaintiffs
as though it was a promise to pay for all the corn so
delivered."
Perhaps the case most frequently cited as authority for
denying an implied promise in cases of sales or agency is
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's Glue Faactory.24 In that case
defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff, agreeing to deliver
such glue as the plaintiff required for one year at 9 per
pound. At the bottom of the letter the plaintiff's president
wrote "accepted" and signed his name. There was no express promise by the plaintiff to buy any glue. The plaintiff, at the time, was engaged in no manufacturing business
in which glue was used or required, nor was it then under
contract to deliver glue to any third parties at a fixed price
or otherwise. It was simply a jobber, selling, among other
things, glue to such customers as might be obtained by sending out salesmen to solicit orders therefor. Under these
circumstances, there may have been an implied promise on
the plaintiff's part that if he needed or required any glue
he would order it of the defendant and of no one else, but
there was no implied promise to order any glue at all events
and no matter what happened. McLaughlin, J., for the
Court of Appeals, said:
"The plaintiff, it will be observed, did not agree to do
or refrain from doing anything. It was not obligated
to sell a pound of defendant's glue or to make any
effort in that direction. It did not agree not to sell
other glue in competition with defendant's. The only
obligation assumed by it was to pay 9 a pound for
such glue as it might order. Whether it should order
any at all rested entirely with it. If it did not order
any glue, then nothing was to be paid.
-4231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 148 (1921).

1936 ]

A PROMISE TO ESTABLISH MUTUALITY

65

"Had the plaintiff neglected or refused to order any
glue during the year 1916, defendant could not have
maintained an action to recover damages against it,
because there would have been no breach of the
contract.

*

* *

"In the instant case, as we have already seen, there
was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to sell
any of the defendant's glue, to make any effort towards bringing about such sale, or not to sell other
glues in competition with it. There is not in the letter a single obligation from which it can fairly be
inferred that the plaintiff was to do or refrain from
doing anything whatever."
On the authority of the Schlegel case, it was decided by
a later New York case 25 that even though an exclusive
agency had been conferred within a certain territory by the
plaintiff upon the defendant and the defendant has assumed
the exclusive agency by acting under it for several years,
there was no implied promise by the defendant to buy any
of the plaintiff's goods in the absence of an express promise
to do so. It seems difficult to square such a decision with
the following statements of Judge Cardozo in a Court of
Appeals decision, rendered twelve years previously:
"The implication of a promise here finds support in
many circumstances. Defendant gave an exclusive
privilege. She was to have no right for at least a
year to place her own indorsements, or make her own
designs, except through the agency of the plaintiff.
See Smith v. Diem, 223 App. Div. 572, 229 N. Y. Supp. 56 (1928) where
the plaintiff wrote to defendants advising them that as long as their purchases
of the "Havana Brown" cigar manufactured by the plaintiff amounted to not
less than 10,000 average weekly shipments, he would not sell that cigar in a
certain territory in which defendants' business of jobbing cigars was located.
Defendants made no reply to the letter, but purchased for several years cigars
of that brand from the plaintiff in excess of the quantity mentioned in the
letter. Later, plaintiff wrote defendants' terminating the arrangement. In an
action to recover the price of cigars delivered, defendants counterclaimed for
breach of contract. The referee's decision dismissing the counterclaim on the
authority of the Schlegel case was affirmed on the ground that the defendants
had not agreed to buy any cigars of plaintiff and hence there was no mutuality of obligation.
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The acceptance of the exclusive agency was an assumption of its duties." 26 (Italics supplied.)
AGENCY CONTRACTS.

The problem has most frequently arisen in connection
with contracts of agency, where either the principal or the
agent has made no express promise in the written instrument which purports to be a bilateral agreement. The most
celebrated case on this point is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff2
Gordon.
7
The defendant had built up a reputation as a
creator of fashions. She entered into a written agreement
with the plaintiff by which he was to have the exclusive
right, subject always to her approval, of placing her indorsements on the designs of others. He was also to have the exclusive right to place her designs on sale, or to license others
to market them. In return, she was to have one-half of "all
profits and revenues" derived from any contracts he might
make. This exclusive right was to last at least one year and
thereafter from year to year unless terminated by notice of
ninety days. Although there was an express promise by the
plaintiff to pay to her one-half of the profits derived from
any contracts he made, there was no express promise by him
to try to make any contracts on her behalf. Cardozo, J.,
writing for the Court of Appeals said:
"The agreement of employment is signed by both parties. It has a wealth of recitals * * *

"It is true that he does not promise in so many words
that he will use reasonable efforts to place defendant's
indorsements and market her designs. We think,
however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied

*

* *

A promise may be lacking, and yet the

whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation'
(Scott, J., in McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App. Div.
62). If that is so, there is a contract.
'Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
'222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
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"The implication of a promise here finds support in
many circumstances. Defendant gave an exclusilve
privilege. She was to have no right for at least a
year to place her own indorsements or market her
own designs except through the agency of the plaintiff. The acceptance of the exclusive agency was an
assumption of its duties. We are not to suppose that
one party was to be placed at the mercy of the other.
Many other terms of the agreement point the same
way. We are told at the outset by way of recital that
'the said Otis F. Wood possesses a business organization adapted to the placing of such indorsements as
the said Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon has approved. The
implication is that plaintiff's organization will be used
for the purpose for which it is adapted.
"But the terms of defendant's compensation are even
more significant. Her sole compensation for the grant
of an exclusive agency is to be one-half of all the
profits resulting from plaintiff's efforts. Unless he
gave his efforts, she could never get anything. Without an implied promise, the transaction cannot have
such business 'efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have' (Bowen, L. J.
in the Mooreock, 14 P. D. 64, 68).
"But the contract does not stop there. The plaintiff
goes on to promise that he will account monthly for
all moneys received by him, and that he will take out
all such patents and copyrights and trademarks as
may, in his judgment, be necessary to protect the
rights and articles affected by the agreement. If he
was under no duty to try to market designs or to place
certificates of indorsement, his promise to account for
profits or take out copyrights would be valueless.
That promise helps to enforce the conclusion that the
plaintiff hzad some duties. His promise to pay the
defendant one-half of the profits and revenues resulting from the exclusive agency and to render accounts
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monthly, was a promise to use reasonable efforts to
bring profits and revenues into existence." 28
Although courts may thus construe the written evidence
of an agreement to imply a promise where an express one
is lacking, it has been held that where a complaint fails to
allege a promise by one who has made no express promise,
the court should not imply 29such a promise for the purpose
of sustaining the complaint.
One of the finest judicial expositions bearing on the
subject of implied promises is found in a case 30 where the
written instrument provided that the agent agreed to sell
the products of the principal for a term of five years and the
' See also Commercial Wood & Cement Co. v. Northampton Portland
Cement Co., 115 App. Div. 388, 100 N. Y. Supp. 960 (1st Dept. 1906) obiter
dictum that although the agent made no express promise to make any sales, or
to endeavor to make any, a covenant to use his best endeavors to sell may be
read into the contract since he expressly promised to keeP a set of books showing sales and to make remittance of receipts. However, since the contract was
held to be void for lack of authority on the part of the executive committee
to enter into it, the .determination of the question of the implication of a
promise was unnecessary.
See also Ellis v. Miller, 164 N. Y. 434, 58 N. E. 516 (1900), where in
consideration of an allowance of $1,000 per annum by the plaintiff the defendants agreed to push and do all in their power to increase the sale of a certain brand of cigarettes (Recruit cigarettes) manufactured by plaintiff. The
agreement was to remain in force for five years. The plaintiff had made no
express promise to sell nor had the defendants made any express promise to
buy the cigarettes in question. Therefore the contention was made that the
only effect of the agreement was to prescribe the terms on which the goods
should be sold in case the plaintiff should be willing to sell and the defendants
be willing to buy. It was held that the agreement did not lack mutuality.
The plaintiff entered into a positive obligation to allow the defendants $1,000
a year to be deducted in equal monthly installments from the current bills.
This necessarily imported an agreement on the plaintiff's part to sell the defendants at least one thousand dollars worth of cigarettes a year; for, otherwise, it would be impossible to credit the defendants with that amount on their
purchases.
'Goldfield v. Foster, 227 App. Div. 543, 238 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dept.
1930) where Proskauer, J., said: "In form, the allegations of the complaint
describe a nudum pactron and not a contract. A plaintiff should plead the
essentials of a valid agreement. We are not here concerned with the interpretation of a piece of written evidence, such as was before the court in the
case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214.
There the complaint alleged a valid contract, and the court held that, while
the writing introduced in evidence at the trial did not contain express words
of agreement to purchase, an inference thereof could be drawn from the language. It does not follow that a similar inference should be drawn wherever
a plaintiff alleges in a pleading merely an agreement on the part of the defendant to sell. If there was a valid contract made, there is no reason why
the plaintiff should not concisely allege it."
'Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N. Y. 187, 105 N. E. 217 (1914).
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principal agreed to pay him a commission on the sale of
goods to be made according to an annexed schedule. The
trial judge had dismissed the cause of action for damages
for breach of contract of employment on the ground that
the contract though imposing on the plaintiff the duty to
serve for five years, did not impose on the defendant a duty
to employ him for a like period and, therefore, that the contract was, at the defendant's option, terminable at will; Mr.
Justice Cardozo said:
"We cannot accept that construction of its meaning.
An intention to make so one-sided an agreement is
not to be readily inferred. (Sanford v. Brown Bros.
(10., 208 N. Y. 90.)"
After observing that the plaintiff, upon looking at the
writing drawn up by the defendant's lawyers and tendered
to him, would find that he was binding himself to sell for
five years for and on account of the defendant, certain paints,
oils and varnishes, a list of which was attached, Mr. Justice
Cardozo continued:
"He could not sell them unless the defendant furnished them. The defendant did not merely accept
the plaintiff's promise to serve it for five years by the
sale of its goods; it agreed to pay him commissions
'on sales of said goods' and spoke of them as sales
'to be made.' The' plaintiff must have understood
this as meaning that the defendant would do its part
in permitting them 'to be made.' It could not do that
part unless it filed the orders which he reported.
Note also that the writing in its opening words is described as an agreement, and not merely of promise.
The plaintiff 'agrees' to serve for five years. The defendant 'agrees' to pay him at certain rates. The
very word 'agreement' connotes a mutual obligation.
(Benedict v. Pincus, 191 N. Y. 377, 383, 384.) There
may be a 'promise' to serve without a promise to employ, but there can be no agreement for service without mutuality of rights and duties. (Richards v.
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Edic, 17 Barb. 260, 263; Baldwin v. Humphry, 44
N. Y. 609, 615.) 'If it be agreed between A and B
that B shall pay A a sum of money for his lands, etc.,
on a particular day, B's words amount to a covenant
by A to convey the lands, for agreed is the word of
both.' (Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 319 1, quoted in
Baldwin v. Humphry, supra.) So, in Richards v.
Edick (supra) where the covenant read: 'The aforesaid party of the first part agrees to sell his farm in
Florence, etc., to the party of the second part for and
in consideration of seventeen hundred dollars.' The
court held that the word 'agreement' necessarily imported two parties, one to sell and one to buy. 'It
was not merely a promise made by one party to the
other, but it was an agreement made by both and
binding on both by every principle of law and morality applicable to the construction of contracts.' These
words are equally applicable to the contract before us.
Just as the plaintiff impliedly undertakes to serve at
the rates which the defendant 'agrees' to pay, so the
defendant impliedly undertakes to accept for the designated term the service which the plaintiff 'agrees'
to render. (Italics supplied.)
"The law, in construing the common speech of men,
is not so nice in its judgments as the defendant's argument assumes. It does not look for precise balance
of phrase, promise matched against promise in perfect
equilibrium. It does not seek such qualities even in
written contracts, unless perhaps the most formal and
deliberate, and least of all does it seek them where
the words are chosen by the master under legal advice and accepted by the servant without the aid of
like instruction. There are times when reciprocal engagements do not fit each other like the parts of an
indented deed, and yet the whole contract, as was
said in McCall Co. v. Wright (133 App. Div. 62, 68)
may be 'instinct with * * * an obligation' imperfectly
expressed. If the defendant meant the plaintiff to
understand that it had a right to discharge him at
pleasure, it could easily have said so in words too
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clear for misconstruction. We think it did not say
so, but by implication said the contrary."
Frequently in agency contracts the principal has failed
to expressly promise to do certain acts necessary by him to
be done in order that the agent may carry out his commission. For example, no express promise may be made by the
principal to furnish the agent with samples and price lists
of the goods. Such a promise has been implied.3 1 Likewise where in an agency agreement there is no express promise by the principal to furnish the goods which were to be
32
sold, such a promise has been implied.
MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS.

A written contract to lease commenced with the words
"we agree" and was signed by both landlord and tenant,
but contained no express promise by the tenant to pay any
rent in advance. It did, however, state that "it is understood that at signing of lease--6 months rent in advance is
to be paid by (tenant)." The court held that a promise to
pay six months' rent is implied, saying: "The phrase, 'it
is understood' * * * means the same as 'it is agreed' and thus
becomes the expression of both parties, not of one only. It
does not mean simply that the Messrs. Pincus (the landlords) understood, but both they and Mr. Smith (the tenant) understood." 11
Sometimes the question whether a written agreement
is a lease or a mere license may depend upon the implication of a promise. For example, the defendant., who conducted a drug store, entered into a written agreement with the
plaintiffs "permitting" plaintiffs to occupy certain space in
'Jacquin v. Boutard, 89 Hun 437, 35 N. Y. Supp. 496 (1895), aff'd,
witlwut opinion, 157 N. Y. 686. 51 N. E. 1091 (1895). In that case Parker,
J., said: "The failure of this promise to appear in the contract was not an
intentional omission, but a mere inadvertence; and, while the courts hesitate
to imply promises in formal contracts, they should do so where otherwise the
manifest intention of the parties would be defeated."
Clement v. Producer's Refining Co., 277 S. W. 634 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
'Bennett v. Pincus, 191 N. Y. 377, 84 N. E. 284 (1908).
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defendant's drug store with soda fountain for five years,
with the privilege of buying goods from the defendant at
ten per cent above wholesale, the defendant to receive a
stated percentage of plaintiffs' gross income. This written
agreement was signed by both parties. There was no express promise by the plaintiffs to enter and remain in occupation of the located space for any period of time. After
the plaintiffs had installed a soda fountain and occupied
the space in defendant's store for some time, the defendant
removed one of the plaintiffs' counters and threatened to remove the fountain. The plaintiffs brought suit for an injunction restraining the defendant and moved for an injunction pendente lite. The defendant contended there was
no enforceable contract for lack of mutuality. An order
granting the motion was affirmed on the ground that the
34
written instrument was a lease and not a mere license.
Wagner, J., said:
"It is manifest that it was intended by the agreement
to confer upon the plaintiffs something more than a
bare license * * *
"An agreement does not of necessity lack mutuality
because it does not contain express reciprocal promises. The agreement, the surrounding circumstances,
and the acts of the parties thereunder, giving practical construction thereto, may reasonably permit the
implication of reciprocal promises and obligations.
"It is our opinion that the agreement under comsideration, though imperfectly expressed, contains mutual obligations. It is a valid lease. The plaintiffs
impliedly bound themselves to install and operate the
soda fountain within a reasonable time from the date
of the execution of the lease * * .
"Here it was clearly within the contemplation of the
parties that the defendant was to grant, and the plaintiffs were obligated impliedly to enter and occupy a
Meers v. Munsch-Protzman Co., 217 App. Div. 541, 217 N. Y. Supp. 256
(1st Dept. 1926).
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definite space of the drug store of the grantor for a
definite period at a fixed rental, with a conditional
right of renewal."
In City of New York v. Paoli,"5 the contract contained
an express agreement of the city that the contractor, Paoli,
"shall have the privilege of picking over all refuse at the
dumps, including paper, rags, wood and metal objects * * *
and shall have the right to appropriate to his own use the
materials." There was no express agreement on the part
of the city to deliver its refuse at the "dumps" for the contractor to pick over. The contractor, therefore, contended
that the contract was void for lack of mutuality. The Court
of Appeals held that a promise on the part of the city to deliver its refuse at the "dumps" is to be implied since such a
correlative covenant was intended. Gray, J., said: "The
agreement of the city that its street refuse should be delivered at the dumps enumerated was indispensable to the effectuation of the contract, and for that reason, it will be
implied."
In Stillwell v. Ocean Steamship Co.,36 the defendant,
by telephone, asked plaintiffs what their rates for transportation of 6,000 barrels of rosin to Chicago and 2,500
barrels of rosin to Buffalo would be. Plaintiff stated the
rates, and defendant replied that they were satisfactory and
asked plaintiffs to confirm the statement by letter, which
plaintiffs did, requesting defendant to advise them "accepted." This the defendant did. The defendant claimed that
no contract was proved by these facts, and that the transaction evidenced thereby amounted to nothing more than an
agreed statement as to the rates. Barrett, J., said:
"If that was the understanding of the parties, they
would hardly have resorted to formal writings upon
the subject, * * *.

It is true that in the case at bar

the parties do not literally use the words 'we agree
to transport 6,000 barrels of rosin from New York to
-202 N. Y. 18, 94 N. E. 1077 (1911).
" 5 App. Div. 212, 39 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1st Dept. 1896).
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Chicago at 12- per 100 pounds, and 2,500 barrels of
per 100
rosin from New York to Buffalo at 6 1
pounds.' But the agreement upon the one side to
furnish the rosin for transportation and upon the
other to transport it, is plainly implied from the language used. They were business men. They were
not drafting a legal document when they wrote these
letters. They were making their contract in their
own way, and expressing themselves in their common
parlance. It was either that or an immense amount
of precise formality about nothing. The letters were
senseless unless they intended to contract; and there
could be no binding contract about a rate disconnected with a contract to transport at such a rate. * * *
When one side confirmed the rates quoted, that was
the carrier's short, mercantile way of saying that they
would transport at those rates. When the other side
accepted the confirmed rate, that was the shipper's
or brother carrier's short, mercantile way of saying
that they would furnish the goods and pay the rate."
SUMMNNARY.

While courts hesitate to imply promises in formal contracts, they should not be astute to construe a contract so
as to render it nugatory. An intention to make a one-sided
agreement is not to be readily inferred. On the other hand,
"the court or jury who are called upon to imply an obligation on the other side which does not appear in the terms of
the contract, must take great care that they do not make
the contract speak where it was intentionally silent." 37
The cases reviewed in this article seem to indicate the
following rules in regard to implying a promise in the absence of an express one.
(1) Where any act of the parties, or either of them, is
essential to carry out the intention of the parties, appearing
from the provisions of the contract, a promise to perform
such act may be implied.3 8
Cockburn, J., in Churchward v. The Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 173 (1865).
' Jugla v. Trouttet, 120 N. Y. 27, 23 N. E. 1066 (1890); City of New
York v. Paoli, 202 N. Y. 18, 94 N. E. 1077 (1911).
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(2) Where the covenant on one side involves some corresponding obligation on the other, as a covenant to sell
necessarily involves a covenant to buy, a promise may be
implied. 39

(3) A promise may be implied where the court or jury
may rightfully assume that. it would have been made if attention had been drawn to it. 4"
(4) It is proper to imply a promise to do an act which
the parties
as business men apparently intended should be
1
done.

4

(5) The words "it is understood" that a certain act be
done, in a written instrument
signed by both parties, imply
42
a promise to do that act.
(6) The word "confirmed" signed by one party to a
written instrument drawn up by the other party, implies a
promise to do the act or acts mentioned in the written instrument to be done by the first party.4 3 But the word
44
"accepted" is not always given that construction.
(7) The word "arrangement" in a written instrument
drawn up and signed by one party, may be evidence of an
45
agreement involving mutual promises.
(8) The phrase "in consideration of" the one party
doing a certain act, the other party expressly promises, may
46
justify the implication of a promise to do that act.
"Butler v. Thomson, 92 U. S. 412, 23 L. ed. 684 (1875).
"Dermott v. The State, 99 N. Y. 101, 1 N. E. 242 (1885); Jacquin v.
Boutard, 89 Hun 437, 35 N. Y. Supp. 496 (1895), aff'd, without opinion, 157
N. Y. 686, 51 N. E. 1091 (1895).
"King v. Leighton, 100 N. Y. 386, 3 N. E. 594 (1885).
"Bennett v. Pincus, 191 N. Y. 377, 84 N. E. 284 (1908).
"Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash. 603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919).
"Mowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 190 Pac.
330 (1920); Carpenter v. Foundation Co., 124 Misc. 765, 208 N. Y. Supp.
327 (1924); Sonino v. Magrini, 225 App. Div. 536, 234 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st
Dept. 1929).
" Fellows v. Fairbanks Co., 205 App. Div. 271, 199 N. Y. Supp. 772
(4th Dept. 1923).
" Fuller & Co. v. Schrenk, 58 App. Div. 222, 68 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1st
Dept. 1901), aff'd, 171 N. Y. 671, 64 N. E. 1126 (1901).
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(9) The phrase
"cash on delivery" implies a promise to
47
pay on delivery.
(10) Where the written instrument signed by both parties recites that one party "agrees to serve" or "agrees to
sell" the word "agrees" connotes a mutual obligation,
so
48
that a promise to pay is implied in both cases.
(11) A promise to do a certain act will be implied when
the agreement, viewed as a whole, would be meaningless in
the absence of a promise to do that act.4 9
(12) Where one party over his signature has consented
to receive certain exclusive rights, the assumption by him
of correlative duties may be implied. 50
In the last analysis the test to be applied in determining
whether to imply a promise where one is silent is to ascertain the intention of the parties, from the language used,
the surrounding facts and circumstances aid the common
sense of the situation.
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